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Performance Analysis of QoS-Differentiated
Pricing in Cloud Computing: An Analytical
Approach
Xiaohu Wu Francesco De Pellegrini
Abstract—A fundamental goal in the design of IaaS service is to enable both user-friendly and cost-effective service access, while
attaining high resource efficiency for revenue maximization. QoS differentiation is an important lens to achieve this design goal. In this
paper, we propose the first analytical QoS-differentiated resource management and pricing architecture in the cloud computing context;
here, a cloud service provider (CSP) offers a portfolio of SLAs. In order to maximize the CSP’s revenue, we address two technical
questions: (i) how to set the SLA prices so as to direct users to the SLAs best fitting their needs, and, (ii) determining how many
servers should be assigned to each SLA, and which users and how many of their jobs are admitted to be served. We propose optimal
schemes to jointly determine SLA-based prices and perform capacity planning in polynomial time. Our pricing model retains high
usability at the customer’s end. Compared with standard usage-based pricing schemes, numerical results show that the proposed
scheme can improve the revenue by up to a five-fold increase.
Index Terms—Cloud computing, QoS differentiation, posted prices, revenue management.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
The worldwide cloud Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS)
market is projected to grow to $71.6 billion in 2020 from
$25.3 billion in 2016 [1], and is attracting all users with
different requirements and budgets to run their applications
on cloud infrastructures. Here, IaaS is used as a means
of delivering value to users by facilitating their access to
computing resources with no need to own and maintain a
whole infrastructure and users only need to pay for the time
duration in which computing infrastructures are consumed.
The design of IaaS obeys fundamental requirements in
service design [2]: plan and organize people, infrastructure,
communication and material components of the service,
aiming at excellence along three dimensions, namely, the ser-
vice quality, the system’s efficiency, and the interaction between
the service provider and its users. This requires a joint effort
to understand both the needs of customers and implement
efficient resource management.
i) Interaction. In the context of IaaS, a pricing model defines
the interaction process between a Cloud Service Provider
(CSP) and its users and the particular conditions under
which computing services are offered to users; from a user’s
viewpoint, it much determines the IaaS usability [3]. There
is a family of theoretical models relying on auction theory,
and an example is the spot instances in Amazon EC2, whose
prices vary over time unpredictably [5]. Each user bids a
price for spot instances, but can get them only if the spot
price is below the bid price [4]; here, users may lose their
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spot instances suddenly and are charged according to the
uncertain spot prices in the period of use.
But, most users may prefer to have exact knowledge of
the actual price at the time of service purchase. For them, to
act as price-takers is the best option in order to consume
their preferred service: they can immediately understand
the price-setting method, participate in with a cost-optimal
strategy, and know the paid price in advance. By design,
the posted pricing method has such desirable payment
properties, which have motivated a few studies [21], [7]. For
instance, in the Google cloud, the price is posted to users in
advance, and each user pays the price times the amount of
usage, referred to as usage-based pricing [6]. So, in this paper
we will investigate the cloud resource provisioning problem
in the posted pricing context.
ii) Resource Efficiency. Once users’ jobs are accepted under
a certain pricing mechanism, a scheduling problem appears:
it concerns the computing system, and involves dispatching
jobs to servers for processing, aiming to maximize resource
efficiency. From a queuing perspective, the system’s uti-
lization is heavily constrained by the characteristics of jobs
being served and could increase as their tolerance to latency
is enlarged [8], [9], [10]. Pricing design is an appropriate tool
to incentivize users to express their job’s characteristics in a
way to improve resource efficiency. In the current usage-
based pricing solutions, users may prefer to process their
jobs immediately upon arrival and not be willing to tolerate
latency margins. This happens even when jobs are actu-
ally delay-tolerant. In fact, current models do not provide
any incentives for elasticity, e.g. discounts for tolerance on
task completion delays. In fact, latency-critical and delay-
tolerant jobs coexist in the cloud. For instance, cloud jobs
from large scale web applications require low response time.
Other jobs such as big data analytics or Google crawling
data processing have batch processing nature and can toler-
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Fig. 1. A main motivation of this paper: QoS-differentiated pricing incen-
tivizes user 2 to express its demand of computing resource as delay-
tolerant jobs, whereas it is not willing to do so under usage-based
pricing.
ate moderate completion delays.
The proposed QoS-differentiated architecture. To sum up,
users of different sources are diverse in terms of their latency
requirements when processing jobs. A basic resource man-
agement architecture arises in the era of cloud computing
where a computing system is shared among users: the
whole system is partitioned into several subsystems and
each subsystem is used to process jobs with similar latency
requirements; in this paper, each subsystem guarantees a
finite delay in the completion of jobs and users can choose
one of the subsystems that best fits their needs.
For example, one subsystem could be used to process
latency-critical jobs, whereas, by offering discounts to users,
the other subsystem is to process delay-tolerant jobs, as
illustrated in Fig. 2. Let us define m1 (m2) the number
of servers in the first (second) subsystem and r1 (r2) the
server utilization fraction. Then, the average utilization
of the m1 + m2 servers is (m1 · r1 +m2 · r2) / (m1 +m2).
However, with no partitioning and no incentive to delay
tolerance, utilization only is r1 because all users prefer
to complete their jobs immediately. With a more intuitive
example: ifm1 = m2, r1 = 0.1, and r2 = 0.5, the partitioned
system has a utilization up to 0.3, three times the system’s
utilization without partitioning.
Several questions come with this architecture. What a
CSP concerns most is often the revenue, rather than the
utilization alone. However, lower (unit) prices are associ-
ated with delay-tolerant jobs in return for the increased
utilization; so, does the increased utilization achieved by
such a architecture must mean an increase in the CSP’s
revenue, in contrast to a purely usage-based pricing? Here,
the revenue obtained from every server in a unit of time is
the product of its utilization and the associated price, where
the utilization represents the amount of workload processed
in a unit of time. Answering the above question involves
optimizing two basic aspects of this architecture: (i) how
much discount should be offered in order for users to submit
their jobs as delay-tolerant ones, and (ii) how many servers
should be assigned to each subsystem; the latter determines
the total amount of jobs it can process under some latency
requirement. In this paper, we consider the case where a
CSP holds a fixed number of homogeneous servers.
Last, the heterogeneity of users in latency requirements
and the potential power of such heterogeneity in resource
management entails the establishment of a fundamental
QoS-differentiated resource management and pricing ar-
chitecture. This can be better perceived by conversely un-
derstanding why it does not arise in traditional computer
systems. Traditionally, they are privately possessed by a user
and used for some special purpose, e.g., Google crawling
data processing; the processed jobs are possibly highly sim-
ilar in terms of latency requirements. Even if a user needs to
process jobs with different latency requirements, it does not
need external incentives and will automatically utilize the
potential delay-tolerant nature to improve resource utiliza-
tion; here, a user usually manages to purchase and possess
enough servers to satisfy all its computing need. However,
in cloud computing, the CSP is a seller who has a shared
system to provide computing services; the pricing aspect
is needed to price the shared resource differently among
users, providing necessary incentives for users to express
their diversity in latency requirements, and the CSP also
needs to determine which subset of users are worth serving,
subject to the capacity constraint.
1.2 Main Results
The main aim of this paper is to demonstrate the poten-
tial of such a QoS-differentiated architecture via a standard
analytical approach to the analysis of its performance [35].
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
(i) Model Overview (Section 3). Formally, in the proposed
pricing model, a CSP posts to users a menu of L SLAs.
The l-th SLA consists of a response time ϕl and its price
θl. The larger the response time, the lower the price. If user i
chooses the l-th SLA, the CSP guarantees that, upon arrival
of a job j of his, such job has maximum waiting time ϕl and
then begins being processed until the completion. The price
of processing a unit of workload under SLA l is denoted
θl. Here, the model is user-friendly and of simplicity from
a user’s perspective: it simply selects a SLA that best fits
its need, maximizing its utility minus the price, and its
cost (the price times the amount of processed workload) is
predictable; it may also be more cost-effective since some
users now have opportunities to take advantage of their
delay-tolerant nature in return for a degraded price.
The pricing model is an interface between the CSP and
its users, determining the acceptance of arriving jobs, and is
further linked to an internal resource management scheme
to process jobs. We partition the whole computing system
into multiple subsystems, each of them serving a specific
SLA and its jobs. At each subsystem, a load balancing policy
is needed to evenly dispatch the accepted jobs to different
servers for processing.
The decision on which policy to use itself is an active
research topic in cloud computing and in this paper our
focus is on the necessity of establishing a QoS-differentiated
architecture and the application of an analytical approach
to analyze its performance. What we do is enabling our
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analysis applicable to a class of policies that are well applied
in cloud environments or mentioned to be promising: they
are such that, obeying a SLA, the maximum rate of accepting
jobs at a subsystem is linearly proportional to the number
of assigned servers; it includes policies such as Random,
Power of Two Choice (PTC), and Join-the-Idle-Queue (JIQ) [34].
For example, the Random policy has ever been applied to
analyze the viability of cloud brokerage services [8] and to
a famous simulator CloudAnalyst for balancing workloads
among virtual machines [46]; so does the PTC policy in the
practice of large-scale cluster management [33].
(ii) Analytical Results (Sections 4 and 5). In this paper, our
objective is maximizing the CSP’s revenue. To do so, we
propose an optimal pricing scheme to determine the prices
of SLAs; SLA prices – each SLA corresponding to a specific
subsystem – affect the choices of users and thus determine
the job arrival rate at each subsystem. Further, we propose
an optimal capacity planning scheme to determine the rate
of accepting jobs at every subsystem, in connection with the
number of assigned servers. In the following, we introduce
the high-level ideas in the process of deriving these two
schemes and what makes our derivation non-trivial.
In our analysis, we first consider the case where the SLA
prices are predetermined and solve the second problem. We
formulate the original problem as an integer linear program
(ILP) and analyze the structure of an optimal solution to the
ILP. We further reduce the ILP problem to a series of simpler
problems whose optimal solution is observable finally. As a
result, we provide an optimal capacity planning scheme for
the second problem. Next, we analyze the structural proper-
ties related to optimal SLA prices. Here, the challenge arises
when there exist multiple SLAs. In contrast, when the whole
system only offers a single SLA, let us consider the users
who succeed in getting services from the CSP and the SLA’s
optimal price is simply a value close to but smaller than
the lowest among these served users’ utilities under this
SLA; however, this is not the case of this paper where users
will make comparisons among all SLAs and select one SLA
that maximizes its surplus, i.e., its utility minus the paid
price. Relying on the optimal capacity planning scheme, we
propose a procedure to obtain an optimal solution to the
first problem.
(iii) Performance Evaluation (Section 6). The proposed ar-
chitecture is compared with the usage-based pricing model;
in fact, the latter corresponds to a special case of the pro-
posed QoS-differentiated pricing where L = 1, i.e., only a
SLA is provided, and our model is complementary to that
model by QoS differentiation. Simulations show that the
revenue of a CSP could be improved by up to a five-fold
increase, ranging from 499.2% to 44.09%. In addition, by
numerical results, we also analyze how the performance of
a QoS-differentiated posted pricing model is affected by the
number of servers that a CSP possesses, and the market en-
vironments such as the total amount of the users’ demands
of computing services, the user population’s sensitivity to
latency (how fast their utility/willingness-to-pay decreases
with the increment of delay), the diversity of users (how
much their values vary) etc.
Finally, although in this paper we analyze and discuss
the proposed QoS-differentiated pricing and resource man-
agement architecture in the case where a CSP holds a fixed
number of servers, it could also be used to analyze under a
particular market environment what is the optimal number
of servers that a CSP should possess and provision to users,
in terms of the maximum revenue it can obtain from the
whole market or other metrics. This can be achieved by us-
ing numerical results to observe how its maximum revenue
changes with the number of servers that it possesses.
2 RELATED WORKS
In this section, we review existing works on pricing of
IaaS services.
Analytical Modeling Spot Pricing. Investigating the poten-
tial models for providing and pricing cloud services and
their effectiveness are very real and important questions for
the providers [22]. Methodologically, of the most relevance
to our work is the existing research line which investi-
gates which model is more effective: offering on-demand
instances alone or offering both spot and on-demand in-
stances to users. As stated above, spot instances are priced
by auctions while on-demand instances are charged a fixed
price per unit of time when utilizing a virtual machine, i.e.,
usage-based pricing.
Such works also based an analytical approach to per-
formance analysis on queuing theory, the standard tool for
evaluating complex computing and communication systems
[35]. In particular, Abhishek et al. modeled the hybrid mar-
ket of Amazon as a queuing system, further analyzed by
auction theory [23]. They use a linear function of a job’s
waiting time to characterize the job’s utility: under the
assumption that the CSP has access to an infinite pool of
resources, they have showed that the introduction of spot
instances could not increase the revenue of a CSP. The
reason for this is that, in a hybrid market, there is no way to
prevent high-value low-waiting-time-cost jobs from choos-
ing the spot market when they would have been willing
to pay a higher on-demand price. More recently, L. Dierks,
and S. Seuken considered a more realistic setting where the
amount of instances is finite. Under such assumption, they
have showed that a hybrid market can indeed lead to higher
revenue than a single on-demand market [24].
Beyond spot pricing, in the recent literature, analytical
models are also proposed to study the viability of cloud
brokerage services under usage-based pricing [8]. In our
work, similar job queuing and user’s utility models are
used. However, we consider the case where multiple service
level agreements (SLAs) are offered to users whereas in [8] a
single SLA is assumed. As a consequence, in our framework,
new combined problems of pricing and capacity planning
arise. In addition, the QoS-differentiated posted pricing is
tested under three analytical policies, whereas in [8] only
the Random policy is considered.
Preliminary Measurement of QoS-Differentiated Pricing.
Recently, the effectiveness of QoS-differentiated posted pric-
ing has been validated via an experimental deployment
[11]. The CSP, based on the current load, can specify two
completion times per submitted job. The corresponding
prices are determined accordingly, where the later a job is
completed, the cheaper the price. The experimental results
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show that such a pricing system can yield 40% improve-
ment over the standard fixed pricing scheme. However, the
pricing scheme in [11] is cloud-centric and not designed to
satisfy per user QoS requirements. In other words, when
the available servers are not enough, the CSP is forced
to announce large job completion times to all users. This
happens even though some of their jobs may be latency-
critical. The latter observation suggests instead to consider
a pre-defined set of QoS requirements, including a wide
range of completion times. Then, a user can choose a QoS
requirement that fits best its need, and the CSP, in turn, has
to ensure that the user’s jobs are completed satisfying the
intended QoS requirements.
Furthermore, in terms of methodologies, performance
evaluation proposed in [11] is based on measurements. Con-
versely, we based our evaluation on analytical modeling.
Obeying to standard performance evaluation methodolo-
gies [35], we complement our analysis with numerical ex-
periment in order to show the viability of QoS-differentiated
pricing.
Mechanism Design. Mechanism design methods have at-
tracted substantial attention so far1. In this type of schemes,
each user reports to the cloud its job requirements, e.g.,
value, workload, and deadline by which a job has to be
completed; a CSP determines which users to be served and
the prices paid by users. One line of works considers either a
static scheme, i.e., by which all servers are sold at one round,
or the case where each user specifies a rigid time interval
and the number of servers requested per time slot [12],
[13], [14], [15]. Another line of works is further motivated
by the fact that the jobs in cloud computing have different
time elasticity due to diverse computing needs. Such works
typically advocate the case for elastic scheduling in presence
of delay-tolerant jobs [17], [18], [19], [16]. In this case, each
user specifies its job’s workload and a large time interval;
however, the user only cares about completing its job in
the specified interval. This grants to the CSP additional
flexibility in order to decide in which slots the job will be
executed; however, all these jobs are still processed in the
same (whole) system and are not differentiated by their
deadline requirements.
It is worth noting that these mechanisms are typically
evaluated using worst-case analysis. The standard method
is to evaluate the performance ratio between the proposed
mechanisms and an ideal, optimal one, under the same pric-
ing and resource allocation model. In our work, conversely,
we focus on which model is better in terms of its usability
and the generated revenue and particularly on the per-
formance improvement obtained when QoS-differentiated
posted pricing is compared with the standard usage-based
pricing method, which does not offer incentives to delay
their job’s completion. By theoretical results and numerical
outcomes we justify that such pricing scheme is indeed
able to attain higher resource efficiency. Finally, the ideally
optimal configuration of such pricing is provided, based on
a queuing model.
Posted Pricing. Posted pricing has been introduced in Sec-
1. Although most of these mechanisms consider the objective of max-
imizing social welfare, it could be related to the revenue maximization
objective of this paper through some existing techniques [20].
tion 1.1. Such scheme is customer-friendly and removes
the complexity in auction-based pricing (see also Google
pricing [6] for further details). Recently, Li et al. advanced
the theoretical foundation of posted pricing in cloud com-
puting [21]. The authors have designed a type of pricing
function based on the resource utilization ratio, and used a
worst-case analysis to derive the competitive ratio, i.e., the
ratio of the social welfare achieved by the pricing function –
used online for every incoming job – and the social welfare
of an optimal solution. In [21], the competitive ratio depends
on the worst value of some job characteristic.
3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
In this section, we describe the QoS-differentiated cloud
pricing system and derive the corresponding internal re-
source management model.
3.1 The Service and Pricing Model
Goal of the CSP. A cloud service provider (CSP) holds a
fixed computing capacity of m servers. Users of different
sources have diverse latency requirements, which could
play a significant role in improving resource utilization.
Pricing them properly could incentivize users to express
such diversity in latency requirements and further allows
the CSP to take advantage of such diversity to do QoS-
differentiated resource management, thus improving re-
source efficiency. A main aim of this work is to satisfy jobs’
QoS requirements while maximizing the CSP’s revenue by
increasing its resource efficiency.
SLAs. There are L Service Level Agreements (SLAs). In gen-
eral, a SLA is specified by the value of some job characteris-
tic: in this work we focus on the job’s waiting times, namely,
ϕ1, ϕ2, · · · , ϕL. When a user i selects the l-th SLA, its job j is
expected to be completed by a time aj+sj+ϕl where aj and
sj are the arrival time and the runtime of j, respectively. To
be clear, after a job arrives at the computing system under
the l-th SLA, it is either waiting in some queue or being
served; the expected total waiting time that it spends in the
system is ϕl.
QoS-Differentiated Pricing. The price of the l-th SLA is
denoted by θl. Here, the parameters ϕl and θl are such that
(i) 0 ≤ ϕ1 < · · · < ϕL, and (ii) θ1 > · · · > θL > 0. The
first SLA specified by {ϕ1, θ1} corresponds to the standard
usage-based pricing in cloud markets (e.g., on-demand in-
stances in Amazon EC2, the pricing in Google cloud). In
such SLA, users do not have incentives to tolerate significant
delays in completing their jobs, i.e., φ1 is set to a small and
negligible value. The corresponding value θ1 is the price
of utilizing a unit of computing resource, i.e., a server or
a virtual machine, in the unit of time for such SLA. For
the other SLAs, prices are lower than θ1, at the expense of
delaying the completion of tagged job j to an expected time
larger than aj + sj . The larger the delay a user can tolerate,
the lower the price.
The overall pricing and scheduling framework devel-
oped in the rest of the paper is simply illustrated in Figure 2.
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Fig. 2. A cloud pricing system: when a user i selects the l-th SLA, all
its jobs are processed at the l-th processing unit and are expected to
have a waiting time ϕl and it will be charged a price θl per second in
order to use a computing unit. The CSP possesses m servers and the
l-th processing unit is assigned ml servers where
∑L
l=1ml ≤ m.
3.2 User’s Choice
We assume that there are a total of K users, denoted
by a set of indexes C = {1, 2, · · · ,K}. As described by
the prospect theory of Tversky and Kahneman [41] and
subsequent behavioral experiments [42], user’s attitude to-
wards delay could be characterized as follows. Users be-
come more and more impatient up to some delay threshold,
but increasingly insensitive once the threshold passes. Fur-
thermore, various users may obtain different values upon
completion of their jobs; thus every user is associated with
a particular weight. Formally, the utility (or willingness-to-
pay) is modeled by a class of functions U(ϕ, α), where ϕ
represents the delay of completing a user’s job; also, users
are differentiated by associating a different weight α to each
user. As a result, we define a class of such utility functions
that are widely used in cloud, electric grids, and other
network pricing systems.
Assumption 1. The user utility U(ϕ, α) = α · U ′(ϕ) + U ′′(ϕ)
satisfies the following properties:
(i) Decreasing in the delay: users’ utility decreases as the
delay ϕ increases where ∂U
′
∂ϕ < 0 and
∂U ′′
∂ϕ < 0 for smooth
utility functions;
(ii) Convexity in the delay: the marginal value is non-
decreasing in ϕ where ∂
2U
∂ϕ2 ≥ 0 for smooth utility
functions;
(iii) Increasing in α: fixing the value of ϕ, U(ϕ, α) is an
increasing linear function of α where U ′(ϕ) > 0.
This class of functions covers a large range of utility
functions. For example, it is often instantiated as quadratic
utility functions in electric markets [43]. The analogy of
cloud and electric markets as utility models lies in that
they both provide users with on-demand access to shared
resources (virtualized machines, electricity) that are paid ac-
cording to consumption [44]. In both cloud computing [25],
[8], [26] and network systems [27], [28] research communi-
ties, utility functions are also specified as the product of a
weight, namely α, and a logarithmic function [8], [26], [27]
(resp. an exponential function [25]). Examples of such utility
functions U(ϕ, α) are:
(ψ + ϕ)−1 + α · ((ψ + ϕ)−1)2, α · log (1 + (ψ + ϕ)−1),
or,
α · (1− β)−1 · (ψ + ϕ)β−1, (1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) and ψ ∈ (0,∞).
In the rest of the work, we incorporate each user prefer-
ence, namely the dependence on α, directly into the users’
utility function as follows.
Definition 3.1. Upon completion of a job whose waiting time in
the system is ϕ, the utility of user i writes
Ui(ϕ) = U(ϕ, αi), ϕ ≥ 0 (2)
where αi is the weight of user i, whereas U(ϕ, α) satisfies
Assumption 1.
Although ϕ is the expected job waiting time of a user, its
utility is in fact measured in dollars per second, spent to use
a given server dedicated to the l-th SLA: this corresponds
to a pay-per usage pricing model under QoS-differentiated
service. The smaller the job waiting time, the larger its (unit)
utility. For example, the utility of user i for completing a job
j, of runtime sj , under the l-th SLA, is sj · Ui(ϕl).
Fig. 3. Decision and job dispatching process at the l-th processing unit.
Decision-making. Each user i will select some SLA to
maximize its (unit) surplus, i.e., its utility minus the paid
price under some SLA. Formally, the surplus of user i under
the l-th SLA is defined as Ui(ϕl) − θl; user i will select the
l∗i -th SLA under which its surplus is greater than zero and
l∗i = arg max
1≤l≤L
{Ui(ϕl)− θl}. (3)
In particular, if there exist multiple SLAs under which user
i achieves the same maximum surplus, user i will select
one of the multiple SLAs randomly. The decision-making
process of user i is also illustrated in Fig. 3; the prices could
be used as decision variables to control which SLA will
be chosen by user i, resulting in that its choice of latency
requirements fulfills the CSP’s expectation. Hence, by set-
ting the SLA prices properly, the pricing system introduced
in Sec. 3.1 could provide incentives for users to express
their diversity in latency requirements, and the CSP could
improve the resource efficiency in terms of revenue after a
corresponding resource management scheme is proposed to
complement the pricing model.
3.3 Capacity Partition
Job arrival at every SLA. Given the SLA prices of our
pricing model, each user i ∈ C will select some SLA l
based on (3) and all its jobs are expected to be completed
with an expected waiting time no greater than ϕl. User i
continuously submits jobs to the cloud system over time. As
done in previous literature for IaaS clouds [8], [24], [29], [30],
we assume that the job arrival rate of user i follows a Pois-
son distribution with mean hi. Also, job arrival processes
of different users are assumed independent. Thus, inter-
arrival time between two consecutive jobs are exponentially
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distributed. We denote by Cl the subset of users who choose
the l-th SLA; it holds that ∪Ll=1Cl = C, where Cl may or may
not be empty for some SLA l. We denote by Λl the total job
arrival rate of users at the l-th processing unit, i.e.,
Λl =
∑
j∈Cl
hj , (4)
Capacity partition. The CSP holds m servers and the whole
computing capacity is divided into L processing units, as
illustrated in Fig. 2; for all 1 ≤ l ≤ L, the l-th processing
unit is assigned ml servers where∑L
l=1
ml ≤ m. (5)
The l-th processing unit is used to exclusively process all
jobs that arrive for the l-th SLA and each server will process
the jobs with the same QoS requirement.
In this paper, we consider the case that the CSP possesses
a fixed number of servers that are assumed homogeneous
virtual machines and the CSP has a limited capacity to
process the arriving jobs. So, a admission control scheme
is needed to determine the rate of accepting jobs that are
processed at the l-th processing unit; here, some of the
arriving jobs may not be processed in order to maximize
the revenue. As elaborated later, the value of ml determines
the processing capacity of the l-th unit, i.e., the maximum
possible rate of accepting jobs in order not to violate the l-th
SLA. Accordingly, we denote by Λ+l the rate of accepting
jobs for processing at the l-th processing unit, where
Λ+l ≤ Λl, (6)
The runtimes of jobs are assumed to be independent
and identically distributed random variables, following a
general distribution with mean ω. In queuing theory, the
mean ω is often normalized to be one for the sake of analysis
and we also do so to make the existing results for job
dispatching directly accessible, as seen in Section 3.4.1. The
mean service rate is the average number of jobs that a server
can serve per unit time, denoted by µ where µ = 1/ω = 1.
We denote by Wl the total workload processed by the l-th
processing unit in a unit of time and it is the product of the
rate of accepting and processing jobs and the mean runtime
of jobs, i.e.,
Wl = Λ
+
l · ω = Λ+l . (7)
What happens at the l-th processing unit is also illustrated
in Fig. 4 and will be further elaborated in the following. As
seen later, the decision variables for revenue maximization
in the resource management part are {Λ+}ls and {m}ls.
3.4 Job Assignment
All accepted jobs to be processed at the l-th unit are
dispatched to each of its servers under a certain dispatching
policy. After dispatching, the first-come-first-served (FCFS)
discipline is applied to process jobs arriving at a single
server [24], [8], [29], [30]. The dispatching policy determines
(i) how many of the accepted jobs will be assigned to each
server of the l-th processing unit, and (ii) the specific relation
between the job arrival rate at each server and the expected
job waiting time. In our analysis of the QoS-differentiated
architecture, the thing that matters is that these two features
determine the processing capacity of the l-th unit, i.e., its
maximum possible rate of accepting and processing jobs.
In this paper, we consider a class of policies, denoting all
such policies by a set D, with the following properties:
Property 1 (Load Balancing). Suppose that a policy in D is
applied to every processing unit. Then, the job arrival rate at each
server of the l-unit follows a Poisson distribution with mean λl =
Λ+l /ml.
The specific policies contained in D are introduced in
Section 3.4.1. Property 1 says that, under a policy in D, the
loads among the ml servers of the l-th unit is uniformly
balanced, and every server of the same processing unit
could be viewed as a single queue with the identical job
arrival rate λl = Λ+l /ml.
The expected waiting time of jobs increases with the job
arrival rate at every server and conversely the following
property holds:
Property 2. Let’s consider a policy in D, and a resulting job as-
signment: the job arrival rate λ at every server of some processing
unit is an increasing function of the expected waiting time of jobs
ϕ, irrelevant of the number of servers assigned to that unit.
λ = Q(ϕ). (8)
If the expected waiting time of jobs at a server is ≤ ϕl,
the job arrival rate at this server should be ≤ λ = Q(ϕ). The
function Q(ϕ) in Property 2 will be instantiated when we
introduce the specific dispatching policies in Section 3.4.1.
In this paper, the l-th SLA guarantees that the expected
waiting time of jobs is no greater than ϕl at the l-th process-
ing unit. This is achieved by guaranteeing that the waiting
time of processed jobs at every server is no greater than ϕl.
So, every server has a processing capacity constraint and the
below lemma follows by Property 2.
Lemma 3.1. Under a job assignment policy in D, at a single
server of the l-th unit, the maximum acceptable job arrival rate
under the l-th SLA is Q(ϕl), denoted by λ(l)max.
The relation of the job arrival rate at every server and
the total rate of processing jobs at the l-th unit is described
in Property 1, and we thus have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. Given an arbitrary number ml, suppose that the
l-th unit is assigned ml servers. The maximum possible rate
of accepting and processing jobs at this unit is λ(l)max · ml, i.e.,
linearly proportional to ml, in order not to violate the l-th SLA.
The rate Λ+l of accepting jobs is constrained by the pro-
cessing capacity of the l-th unit and we have by Lemma 3.2
that:
Λ+l ≤ ml · λ(l)max. (9)
3.4.1 Dispatching Policies
In IaaS services, dispatching policies should have the
capacity of simultaneously dispatching numerous jobs to
servers in parallel, rather than sequentially like what a
central queue does [33], [10]. In this paper, we consider
three dispatching policies that not only satisfy Properties 1
and 2 but also are promising in cloud environments [8], [46],
[33], [34]. Each policy has a particular way to communicate
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Fig. 4. Decision and job dispatching process at the l-th processing unit.
among jobs, dispatchers and servers and the three policies
are described below.
Random: for every job that arrives at the l-th processing
unit, immediately choose a server with the same probability
1
ml
and assign this job to the server;
PTC: for every arriving job, choose two servers randomly,
probe them, and, assign this job to the server with fewer
queued jobs;
JIQ-Random: at the l-th unit, κl dispatchers are maintained.
Whenever a server of the l-th unit becomes idle, it ran-
domly chooses a dispatcher and informs the dispatcher
of its idleness. On the other hand, for every arriving job,
immediately assign it to a dispatcher chosen randomly; if
there are recorded idle servers at this dispatcher, it will
assign the job to an idle server chosen randomly; otherwise,
just assign the job to a randomly chosen (idle or non-idle)
server from the l-th unit. For the analysis sake, we shall
consider the case when φ = ml/κl is constant across the
deployment.
Now, we instantiate D as a set of the three dispatching
policies: Random, PTC, and JIQ-Random, and give the re-
lated results to also instantiate the function (8) in Property 2
when a particular policy in D is considered. We note that, in
the literature of cloud computing, Pareto distribution is of-
ten used for characterizing the job’s runtime of a published
Google’s workload [8], while exponential distribution is also
applied commonly [29], [30] or for a particular Microsoft’s
production workload [10]. Often, the mean of runtimes is
normalized to be one for simplifying the analysis, as seen in
the analysis of the PTC and JIQ-Random policies [32], [31].
Every policy in D satisfies Property 1 and the reason for
this is its randomness when choosing a server or dispatcher
and the details can be found in [8], [32], [31]. Now, we intro-
duce the related results for Property 2. In a study of cloud
brokerage service [8], the Random policy is used. When the
runtimes of jobs follow an exponential distribution, all jobs
have an expected waiting time
ϕ = ρ/(µ− λ). (10)
In the case that the runtimes of jobs follow a type of
heavy-tailed distribution, i.e., Pareto distribution, with a
shape parameter η > 1 and a scale parameter xm (i.e., the
minimum runtime), the expected runtime of jobs is ηxmη−1 .
When 1λ− ηη−1xm > 0, all jobs have a finite expected waiting
time [8]
ϕ =
1
λ
log
(
η · (λxm)η · Γ(−η, λxm)
1− λ · (ηxm)/(η − 1)
)
, (11)
where Γ(s, z) =
∫∞
z
xs−1e−xdx is the upper incomplete
gamma function. In [32], the PTC policy is considered and
the analytical result is given by assuming the job’s runtime
follows an exponential distribution. The expected waiting
time of jobs is
ϕ = λ2/
(
1− λ2) . (12)
In [31], the JIQ policy is considered and a general distribu-
tion is used to characterize the runtime of jobs. The expected
waiting time of jobs under JIQ is
ϕ = ((C + 1)/2) · (λ/(1− λ)/(1 + φ)) , (13)
where the parameter C is the ratio of the variance of
the particular runtime distribution to its mean squared.the
mean runtime of jobs is 1.
With (10), (11), (12), and (13), we can illustrate how the
utilization increases with waiting time where the utilization
is λ ·ω, i.e., the product of the mean runtime of jobs and the
job arrival rate at a server. A graph is reported in Figure 5,
for µ = 1 and φ = 10. The red dotted, blue, and green lines,
respectively, represent the performance of Random, PTC,
and JIQ policies in the case when the service time follows an
exponential distribution; the red line represents the curve of
the Random policy where the service time follows a Pareto
distribution with xm = 1.001/2.001 and η = 2.001.
Finally, the key notation of this paper is listed in Table 1.
In this paper, we use the script of a capital letter to denote a
set, e.g., C denotes a set of the indexes of users. In contrast,
the script of a capital letter with input variables is often
used to denote a function, e.g., U(ϕ, α) denotes the utility
function. In addition, as seen later, the bold letter is used to
denote a vector, e.g., θ denotes the SLA prices (θ1, · · · , θL).
In this paper, all omitted proofs can be found in the
appendix.
4 GOALS AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
After we introduced the QoS-differentiated pricing and
resource management architecture, we proceed to tackle the
main objective of this work, i.e., the maximization of a CSP’s
revenue. To achieve this, the whole optimization process is
divided into two correlated phases: capacity planning and
optimal prices determination.
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Fig. 5. The increase of system utilization with the waiting time.
TABLE 1
Key Notation
Symbol Explanation
L the number of SLAs
ϕl the waiting time of the l-th SLA
θl (resp. θ∗l ) the price (resp. the optimal price) of the l-th SLA
m the total number of servers possessed by a CSP
ml (resp. m∗l ) the (resp. optimal) number of servers assigned
to the l-th processing unit
Λ+l (resp. Λ
∗
l ) the (resp. optimal) rate of accepting job arrival
rate at the l-th processing unit
λ
(l)
max the maximum acceptable job arrival rate at each
server of the l-th SLA processing unit, in order
not to violate the l-th SLA
4.1 Decision Variables, and Objective
We denote the prices of the 1-th, 2-th, · · · , L-th SLAs
by a price vector θ = (θ1, · · · , θL), the number of servers
assigned to every processing unit l by m = (m1, · · · ,mL),
and the rate of accepting and processing jobs at every
unit l by Λ+ = (Λ+1 , · · · , Λ+L). To maximize the revenue
generated by the QoS-differentiated architecture defined in
Section 3, the decision variables are m, Λ+, and θ, which
are elaborated in the following.
Recall the pricing model and the user’s choice process
in Section 3.1 and 3.2. As illustrated in Fig. 3, each tagged
user selects a SLA based on (3) to maximize its surplus; as a
result, for all l ∈ [1, L], the subset of users Cl who choose the
l-th SLA is determined. Further, the arrival rate Λl of jobs at
every processing unit l is obtained by (4). Here, the users’
choices C1, · · · , CL and the corresponding job arrival rates
Λ1, · · · , ΛL are dominated by the price vector θ, which is a
decision variable.
Further, the CSP has a fixed number of servers. Under
every SLA, there is a threshold such that the SLA will
be violated if the job arrival rate at a server exceeds the
threshold by Lemma 3.1; thus, the CSP has limited process-
ing capacity. Facing the jobs arriving at every processing
unit, the decision variables are the rate of accepting and
processing jobs at every processing unit, i.e., Λ+, and,
the number of servers to assigned to every unit, i.e., m;
intuitively, our aim is to accept as many jobs as possible at
one SLA under which every server of some unit could yield
higher revenue.
The total workload processed by the l-th unit in a unit of
time is Wl defined in (7). Users are charged for each unit of
resources they actually use (i.e., the actual use of a server in
a unit of time). For a unit of time, the total revenue obtained
from the whole l-th unit is Wl · θl. The CSP’s total revenue
is the sum of the revenues of all units, i.e.,
V(m,Λ+,θ) =
∑L
l=1
Wl · θl (b)=
∑L
l=1
θl · Λ+l (14)
where the equation (b) is due to (7). Here V(m,Λ+,θ) can
be interpreted as the expected total revenue generated by
the whole cloud system in a unit of time.
4.2 Capacity Planning:m and Λ+
We first ignore the optimality of the SLA prices θ and
consider the case where θ is pre-assigned arbitrarily; our
aim is to maximize (14), i.e., the revenue of a CSP. In this
case, our decision variables are the rate of accepting jobs Λ+l
at every unit l and the number ml of assigned servers; the
job arrival rate Λl at every unit l is known.
Problem 1. Under arbitrary, pre-assigned, SLA’s prices θ, we
denote V(m,Λ+,θ) in (14) by Vθ(m,Λ+); the revenue maxi-
mization problem can be written as
maximize Vθ(m,Λ+)
with m and Λ+ as decision variables and subject to constraints
(5), (6), and (9).
Constraint (5) says that the total number of servers
assigned to different processing units is ≤ the total number
of servers available. (6) says that at the l-th unit the rate of
accepting and processing jobs is ≤ the total job arrival rate
of users who choose the l-th SLA, which is determined by
the SLA prices. (9) says that the rate of accepting jobs should
be ≤ the maximum possible rate of accepting jobs in order
not to violate the l-th SLA, by Lemma 3.2.
We will in Section 5.1 give an optimal solution to Prob-
lem 1, i.e., the optimal values ofm and Λ+, denoted bym∗
and λ∗; as a result, we could derive the maximum revenue
of a CSP under an arbitrary, pre-assigned, tuple θ of SLA
prices. Here, the optimal capacity planning and admission
control are realized and defined by m∗ and Λ∗, which are
linked to an arbitrarily given θ; thus,m∗ and Λ∗ could also
be viewed as the functions of θ: m∗θ and λ
∗
θ (or m
∗(θ) and
λ∗(θ)).
4.3 Optimal Prices: θ
Under posted price models, users are price-takers who
choose a SLA according to (3). The determination of optimal
SLA prices θ is needed to steer each user to the most suitable
SLA for revenue maximization. Once Problem 1 is solved
optimally, our objective function (14) could be expressed as
a function of θ:
V (m,Λ+,θ) = V (m(θ),Λ+(θ),θ) ; (15)
this means that, currently, we could derive the CSP’s maxi-
mum revenue once the optimal SLA prices are derived; here,
the decision variable is the price vector θ. Let Θ denote all
possible tuples of SLA prices, i.e., Θ = {θ | θ1, · · · , θL ∈
R+}. The optimal pricing problem writes:
Problem 2. The optimal price vector is defined as
θ∗ := arg maxθ∈Θ function (15), (16)
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subject to the condition (3), i.e., how the job rate for each SLA is
affected by price vector θ.
Recall that there are K users and C = {1, 2, · · · ,K}.
Under an arbitrary tuple of SLA prices θ ∈ Θ, the l-th
SLA is chosen by a subset of users Cl ⊆ C. In the case
where Cl is empty, no users will choose the l-th SLA; in
turn, this price could be equivalently viewed to be∞. Based
on such observations, we consider a corresponding subset
S = {l1, l2, · · · , lL′} of {1, 2, · · · , L}, and let S define a
subset of SLAs to be chosen by users: each of the l1-th, · · · ,
lL′ -th SLAs will be chosen by some users while no users
chooses the other SLAs, that is, Cl 6= ∅ for all l ∈ S and
Cl = ∅ for all l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , L}−S . We denote by ΘS all price
tuples such that, under every tuple of SLA prices θ ∈ ΘS ,
the subset of SLAs chosen by users is defined by the subset
S . As a result, all possible tuples of SLA prices are grouped
by users’ choices of SLAs and each group is distinguished
by the S defined above, denoted by ΘS , that is,
Θ =
⋃
S⊆{1,2,··· ,L}ΘS
Our subsequent results in Section 5.2 show that only if
we are given that subset S of {1, 2, · · · , L} that is used to
define which SLAs to be chosen by users as explained above,
an analysis of the structural properties of user’s choices
could derive the corresponding optimal prices of SLAs,
denoted by θ∗(S), that maximizes (15); in other words,
among all θ ∈ ΘS , (15) achieves the highest value when
θ = θ∗(S), that is,
θ∗(S) := arg maxθ∈ΘS (15). (17)
Here, the prices of the l1-th, · · · , lL′ -th SLAs are optimally
determined by the analysis and the prices of the other SLAs
are trivially set to∞ since no user chooses them. To finally
maximize (15), we only need to select such a subset S∗
from all the subsets of {1, 2, · · · , L} that (15) generates the
highest value under θ∗(S∗); formally, we simply denote the
objective function V (m(θ),Λ+(θ),θ) in (15) by G(θ) and
have that
S∗ := arg maxS⊆{1,2,··· ,L} G(θ∗(S)).
Here, θ∗(S∗) is an optimal solution to Problem 2.
In the above process, the only question is how to derive
the optimal SLA prices θ∗(S), and we will in Section 5.2
solve (17) optimally.
5 REVENUE MAXIMIZATION
In this section, we maximize the revenue of a CSP given
its capacity, optimally solving the two problems in Section 4.
5.1 Capacity Planning
In this subsection, we give an optimal solution to Prob-
lem 1, producing an optimal capacity planning scheme in
the case that the SLA prices are pre-assigned.
Under pre-assigned SLA prices, the job arrival rate of
users who choose the l-th SLA is Λl; we have by Lemma 3.2
that the minimum number of servers needed to process all
the arriving jobs at the l-th processing unit is dΛl/λ(l)maxe.
In the case that
∑L
l=1 dΛl/λ(l)maxe ≤ m, there are enough
servers to process all jobs arriving at different units. In this
case, an optimal solution to Problem 1 is as follows: Λ+l = Λl
and ml = dΛl/λ(l)maxe; it means accepting all jobs that arrive
at each processing unit and assigning ml servers to the l-th
unit for all l ∈ [1, L].
In the rest of this subsection, we study the opposite case
where ∑L
l=1
dΛl/λ(l)maxe > m; (18)
by Lemma 3.2, this means that, m servers are not enough
to process all jobs that arrive at different units while satis-
fying their QoS requirements. Here, we also note that, the
following solving process itself is a purely mathematical
derivation, although we sometimes additionally explain the
physical meaning of some results for better perceiving their
intuitions.
Letml be the maximum integer such thatml ·λ(l)max ≤ Λl,
i.e., ml = bΛl/λ(l)maxc, and let λ′l = Λl − λ(l)max ·ml; here, we
have
Λl = ml · λ(l)max + λ′l (19)
0 ≤ λ′l < λ(l)max. (20)
Lemma 5.1. In an optimal solution to Problem 1, some relation
between the two decision variables Λ+l and ml is satisfied:
1) if ml · λ(l)max ≤ Λl, then Λ+l = ml · λ(l)max where ml ≤
ml.
2) if ml · λ(l)max > Λl, then Λ+l = Λl and ml = ml + 1; in
this case, we also have λ′l > 0.
The physical meaning of Lemma 5.1 is as follows. Under
the l-th SLA, every server has a limited processing capacity,
and, given the ml servers at the l-th unit, the maximum
possible rate of accepting jobs is ml · λ(l)max, by Lemma 3.2.
In the case that the total job arrival rate of users who choose
the l-th SLA is ≤ ml · λ(l)max, the l-th unit will accept all the
arriving jobs in order to maximize the revenue that these
ml servers could generate in a unit of time, i.e., Λ+l = Λl;
otherwise, the optimal rate of accepting jobs Λ+l is ml ·λ(l)max.
In both the cases, every unit l is assigned ml servers, that
is, the minimum number of servers needed to process the
accepted jobs under the l-th SLA, by Lemma 3.2.
In this subsection, we will finally give an optimal so-
lution to Problem 1. Next, we will combine the relation of
Λ+l and ml in Lemma 5.1 into constraints (5), (6), and (9).
We hence reduce the original problem to a series of simpler
mathematical problems. This provides better insight into the
structure of optimal solution to Problem 1.
These reductions are mainly built on the following obser-
vation, describing the relations of the original and reduced
problems. Suppose an (original) problem A aims to maxi-
mize the function G(x), subject to x ∈ X , where X denotes
a set of all feasible solutions; an optimal solution is a x∗ ∈ X
such that G(x∗) ≥ G(x) for all x ∈ X . Given a set Y , assume
there is a mapping f from Y to X , i.e., x = f(y) ∈ X for all
y ∈ Y . The (reduced) problem B aims to maximize G(f(y))
subject to y ∈ Y .
Observation 5.1. Suppose this mapping f is a surjection, i.e.,
for any x ∈ X , there exists a y ∈ Y such that x = f(y). An
optimal solution y∗ to the problem B, corresponds to, an optimal
solution x∗ to the problem A, where x∗ = f(y∗).
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In Problem 1, the constraints define a set of feasible solu-
tions
(
m, Λ+
)
to it and, now, we begin reducing Problem 1.
Observation 5.2. We aim to find an optimal solution to Prob-
lem 1, and assume that the relation between the two variables ml
and Λ+l satisfies Lemma 5.1, as well as the constraints (5), (6),
and (9).
Let xl and yl denote two integer variables that satisfy the
following constraints:
0 ≤ xl ≤ ml,
yl ∈ {0, 1} if (xl = ml ∧ λ′l > 0) , and yl = 0 otherwise,
(21)
and, ∑L
l=1
(xl + yl) ≤ m. (22)
There exists a surjection from (xl, yl) to (ml,Λ+l ) as follows:[
ml Λ
+
l
]
=
[
xl yl
]×A, (23)
where A is a matrix as follows:
A =
[
1 λ
(l)
max
1 λ′l
]
Problem 3. Problem 1 is rewritten as:
maximize
∑L
l=1 xl · (θl · λ(l)max) + yl · (θl · λ′l),
with x1, · · ·xL and y1, · · · yL as decision variables and subject to
the constraints (21), and (22).
By Observation 5.2, the relation (23) defines a surjection
from (xl, yl) to (ml,Λ+l ) in the case that the related con-
straints are satisfied. Due to Observation 5.1, we conclude
that
Lemma 5.2 (Equivalence). An optimal solution to Problem 3
corresponds to an optimal solution to Problem 1 where these two
optimal solutions satisfy (23).
Recall the definition of ml. In the case that ml = 0 where
Λl < λ
(l)
max, due to constraint (21) alone, we derive that the
variable xl is zero in any feasible solution to Problem 3; We
denote by A a subset of {1, 2, · · · , L} such that
(i) ml > 0 for all l ∈ A, and
(ii) ml = 0 for all l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , L} − A.
In the case that λ′l = 0 (i.e., Λl = ml · λ(l)max), due to (21)
alone, we derive that yl = 0. Similarly, we denote by B a
subset of {1, 2, · · · , L} such that
(i) λ′l > 0 for all l ∈ B, and
(ii) λ′l = 0 for all l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , L} − B.
Observation 5.3. There exists a surjection from
({xl}l∈A,
{yl}l∈B
)
to
({xl}Ll=1, {yl}Ll=1) as follows:
xl = xl for all l ∈ A, and, yl = yl for all l ∈ B
xl = 0 for all l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , L} − A
yl = 0 for all l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , L} − B
(24)
where
({xl}Ll=1, {yl}Ll=1) is subject to (21) and (22); and
({xl}l∈A, {yl}l∈B) is subject to
0 ≤ xl ≤ ml, for all l ∈ A,
yl ∈ {0, 1} ifxl = ml, and yl = 0 otherwise, for all l ∈ B, (25)
and, ∑
l∈A xl +
∑
l∈B yl ≤ m. (26)
Problem 4. Problem 3 is rewritten as:
maximize
∑
l∈A xl · (θl · λ(l)max) +
∑
l∈B yl · (θl · λ′l),
subject to constraints (25) and (26).
Due to Observations 5.1 and 5.3, we conclude that
Lemma 5.3 (Equivalence). An optimal solution to Problem 4
corresponds to an optimal solution to Problem 3 where these two
optimal solutions satisfy (24).
Now, we proceed to reduce Problem 4 to another prob-
lem, whose optimal solution is observable.
Observation 5.4. Let the decision variables xl and yl satisfy the
constraints (25), and (26); let xl,1, · · · , xl,ml and yl satisfy
xl,1, · · · , xl,ml ∈ {0, 1} for all l ∈ A. (27)
yl ∈ {0, 1} if
∑ml
j=1
xl,j = ml, and, yl = 0 otherwise,
for all l ∈ B.
(28)
∑
l∈B yl +
∑
l∈A
∑ml
j=1
xl,j ≤ m. (29)
There exists a surjection from (xl,1, · · · , xl,ml , yl) to (xl, yl) as
follows:
xl =
∑ml
j=1
xl,j , and, yl = yl. (30)
Problem 5. Problem 4 is rewritten as:
maximize
∑
l∈A
ml∑
j=1
xl,j · (θl · λ(l)max)+
∑
l∈B
yl · (θl · λ′l), (31)
with xl,j and y1, · · · yL as decision variables and subject to
constraints (27), (29) and (28).
Due to Observations 5.1 and 5.4, we conclude that
Lemma 5.4 (Equivalence). An optimal solution to Problem 5
corresponds to an optimal solution to Problem 4 where these two
optimal solutions satisfy (30).
In the following, we solve Problem 5. We only need to
determine the variables xl,1, · · · , xl,ml for all l ∈ A and the
variable yl for all l ∈ B. For the coefficient of each variable
xl,j , we denote it by ζ
(1)
l,j ; for the coefficient of yl, denote it
by ζ(2)l ; here, we have ζ
(1)
l,j > ζ
(2)
l since (θl ·λ(l)max) > (θl ·λ′l).
The objective function in Problem (5) is equivalent to the
following one:∑
l∈A
∑ml
j=1
xl,j · ζ(1)l,j +
∑
l∈B yl · ζ
(2)
l (32)
Theorem 5.1. Algorithm 1 produces an optimal solution to
Problem 5.
Theorem 5.2. Algorithm 2 produces an optimal solution to
Problem 1.
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Algorithm 1: An optimal solution to Problem 5
1 select m variables from xl,1, · · · , xl,ml for all l ∈ A
and yl for all l ∈ B such that the chosen variables are
of the largest coefficients among all the variables in
the objective function (31) or (32), denoting these
chosen variables by D;
2 set the values of the chosen variables to 1, and the
values of the other variables to 0;
Algorithm 2: An optimal solution to Problem 5
1 call Algorithm 1 to produce an optimal solution to
Problem 5;
/* derive an optimal solution to Problem 4 by
Lemma 5.4 */
2 xl ←
∑ml
j=1 xl,j for all l ∈ A;
3 the value of yl in Problem 4 is equivalent to the value
of yl in Problem 5;
/* derive an optimal solution to Problem 3 by
Lemma 5.3 */
4 xl ← 0 for all l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , L} − A;
5 yl ← 0 for all l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , L} − B;
/* derive an optimal solution to Problem 1 by
Lemma 5.2 */
6 ml ← xl + yl;
7 Λ+l ← λ(l)max · xl + λ′l · yl;
5.2 Prices of Different SLAs
As elaborated at the end of Section 4.3, we now solve
(17) optimally where S = {l1, · · · , lL′}. The problem (17)
is as follows: when each of the l1-th, · · · , lL′ -th SLAs will
be chosen by some users and no users chooses the other
SLAs, what is the optimal prices of SLAs? In the following,
without loss of generality, we consider the case that each of
the L SLAs will be chosen by some users where L′ = L
and propose an algorithm to determine the optimal SLA
prices θ∗1 , θ
∗
2 , · · · , θ∗L. Such an algorithm is also applicable
to the case that only a subset of SLAs will be chosen by
users; here, the prices of the other SLAs are set to ∞
trivially. We also assume that α1 > α2 > · · · > αK for
the coefficients appearing in Definition (3.1). As a result, the
utility functions of all users satisfy the following relation:
U1(ϕ) > U2(ϕ) > · · · > UK(ϕ), for any time ϕ ∈ R. (33)
In the following, we identify some structural property
on users’ choices of SLAs under an arbitrary setting of the
SLA prices; then, we consider the case that the particular
structure in an optimal solution is known in advance and
derive the corresponding SLA optimal prices. Next, we
search all the feasible structures for the structure under
which the CSP achieves the highest revenue; the optimal
prices under such a structure will be the optimal SLA prices
of this paper.
Lemma 5.5. Under an arbitrary price vector θ ∈ ΘS where
S = {1, · · · , L}, users behave as follows: there exist integers
1 ≤ i1 < · · · < iL ≤ K such that, for all l ∈ [1, L], the l-th
SLA is to be chosen by users il−1 + 1, · · · , il, where i0 = 0.
Proof. Let 1 ≤ j1 < j2 < L, and i′1 and i′2 denote two
users who will respectively choose the j1-th and j2-th SLAs;
in this case, we could observe that i′1 < i
′
2. We prove this
observation by contradiction. Otherwise, we have i′1 > i
′
2;
the choices of users i′1 and i
′
2 alone imply the following
relations on their surplus under the j1-th and j2-th SLAs: (i)
Ui′1(ϕj1) − θj1 ≥ Ui′1(ϕj2) − θj2 , and (ii) Ui′2(ϕj1) − θj1 ≤Ui′2(ϕj2)− θj2 . Multiplying the second inequality by -1 and
adding it to the first inequality, we derive that
Ui′1(ϕj1)− Ui′1(ϕj2) ≥ Ui′2(ϕj1)− Ui′2(ϕj2). (34)
By Definition 3.1, the utility function satisfies Assumption 1;
by its 1st point, we have U ′(ϕj1) > U ′(ϕj2) > 0. Further,
Ui′1(ϕj1) − Ui′2(ϕj1) = (αi′1 − αi′2) · U ′(ϕj1) < (αi′1 − αi′2) ·U ′(ϕj2) = Ui′1(ϕj2) − Ui′2(ϕj2) where αi′1 − αi′2 < 0 since
i′1 > i
′
2, which contradicts (34). Now, we have completed
proving the above observation.
Each SLA will be chosen by a subset of users. Now,
consider the tagged users in the order of 1, 2, · · · , L; let
il denote the last user who will choose the l-th SLA. Facing
the L SLAs, a user will finally choose some SLA if there
exists a SLA under which its surplus is > 0. Under the
above observation, users il−1 + 1, · · · , il will only consider
choosing the l-th SLA. The surplus of user il under the l-th
SLA is > 0; so is the surplus of users il−1 + 1, · · · , il − 1 if
il−1 + 1 < il, by (33). Hence, all these users will choose the
l-th SLA and Lemma 5.5 holds.
A CSP’s capacity is limited and possibly only a subset
of users will get served; here, iL ≤ K . We denote by θ∗1 ,
· · · , θ∗L an optimal solution for the SLA prices. Under such
prices, we assume by Lemma 5.5 that the l-th SLA will be
chosen by a subset of users C∗l = {i∗l−1 + 1, · · · , i∗l }, which
determines the total job arrival rate at the l-th processing
unit, i.e., Λl =
∑i∗l
j=i∗l−1+1
hj as defined by (4). With the SLA
prices and job arrival rates, we could derive the maximum
revenue (14) of a CSP by Algorithm 2 that will determine
the rate Λ+l of accepting jobs at every unit.
In the following, we analyze what are the optimal prices
of SLAs to maximize the revenue (14) in the case that we
know the users’ choices of an optimal solution where the
l-th SLA is chosen by users C∗l . In our subsequent analysis,
if |C∗l | = 1 where C∗l = {i∗l }, we assume that the maximum
revenue is achieved when the l-th SLA are chosen by C∗l ;
however, if user i∗l changes its choice to the (l+ 1)-th SLA, a
lower revenue (14) will be achieved by Algorithm 2. Such
a particular assumption does not affect us to derive an
optimal solution for the SLA prices under which the revenue
(14) is maximized. The reason is as follows. Suppose that
there exists some l ∈ [1, L − 1] such that the maximum
revenue is generated no mater whether the user i∗l chooses
the l-th or (l + 1)-th SLA. For all such l, we consider a new
case on users’ choices: the user i∗l changes its choice to the
(l + 1)-th SLA and the choices of the other users do not
change, after which no users chooses the l-th SLA. In this
new case, the maximum revenue could still be achieved and
it fulfills the above assumption although possibly not all the
L SLAs might be chosen by users where |S| ≤ L; only if
we could give the corresponding optimal SLA prices where
the CSP achieves the maximum revenue under such users’
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choices, we will have obtained an optimal solution for the
SLA prices among all possible optimal solutions.
Definition 5.1. For all l ∈ [1, L], let U−i∗l = Ui∗l (ϕl) −Ui∗l (ϕl+1). We define parameter θ′l to be such that,
(i) θ′L is a value smaller than but close to Ui∗L(ϕL), i.e.,
θ′L = Ui∗L(ϕL) − , where  is a small enough positive
real number;
(ii) for all l ∈ [1, L− 1], θ′l is the maximum possible θl that
satisfies θl < U−i∗l + θ
′
l+1, i.e., θ
′
l = U−i∗l + θ
′
l+1 − .
Theorem 5.3. In an optimal solution where a CSP achieves the
maximum revenue (14), we assume for all l ∈ [1, L] that the l-th
SLA will be chosen by users C∗l = {i∗l−1 + 1, · · · , i∗l }. Given the
knowledge of C∗1 , · · · , C∗L, the corresponding optimal price θ∗l of
the l-th price is θ′l in Definition 5.1.
Proof. We first prove that, when the SLA prices are θ′1, · · · ,
θ′L in Definition 5.1, we could derive for all l ∈ [1, L] that
the l-th SLA will be chosen by users i∗l−1 + 1, · · · , i∗l ; this
will show that θ′1, · · · , θ′L are a feasible solution. For all
i ∈ [i∗l−1 +1, i∗l ], the surplus of user i respectively under the
l′-th and (l′ + 1)-th SLA is denoted by g(l
′)
i = Ui(ϕl′) − θ′l′ ,
and g(l
′+1)
i = Ui(ϕl′+1) − θ′l′+1 where l′ ∈ [1, L − 1]; then,
recall Definition 3.1 where Assumption 1 is satisfied and we
have
g
(l′)
i − g(l
′+1)
i = (αi − αi∗l′ ) · (U ′(ϕl′)− U ′(ϕl′+1)) + .
By Assumption 1, U ′(ϕ) decreases as ϕ increases, and thus
(i) if l = L, we have αi − αi∗
l′
< 0 and further have
g
(l′)
i < g
(l′+1)
i , that is, g
(L)
i > g
(L−1)
i > · · · > g(1)i ;
similarly, we also have that
(ii) if l ∈ [2, L− 1], g(1)i < · · · < g(l)i > · · · > g(L)i .
(iii) if l = 1, we have g(1)i > g
(2)
i > · · · > g(L)i .
Hence, we have for all i ∈ [i∗l−1 + 1, i∗l ] that user i achieves
the highest surplus only under the l-th SLA, and it will
choose the l-th SLA.
As shown by (14), no matter what the optimal rate Λ+l of
accepting jobs at every unit l is, larger SLA prices could al-
ways lead to larger revenue; hence, given the users’ choices,
the maximum possible SLA prices under which users will
make such choices are also the optimal SLA prices θ∗l , · · · ,
θ∗L. Above, we have proved that θ
′
1, · · · , θ′L are feasible SLA
prices such that for all l ∈ [1, L] the l-th SLA is chosen by
users C∗l . Now, we prove that they are also the maximum
possible, i.e., θ∗l = θ
′
l for all l ∈ [1, L].
In terms of the L-th SLA, the utilities of users satisfy
Ui∗L−1+1(ϕL) > · · · > Ui∗L(ϕL) and, in order to ensure that
users i∗L−1 +1, · · · , i∗L will choose the L-th SLA, a necessary
condition is that the surplus of each user should be > 0;
hence, we have Ui∗L(ϕL)−θl > 0, and the maximum possible
price of the L-th SLA is θ′L. For all l ∈ [1, L− 1], in terms of
the l-th SLA, the surplus of user i∗l achieves the maximum
surplus under the l-th SLA, and we have
Ui∗l (ϕl)− θl ≥ Ui∗l (ϕl+1)− θl+1. (35)
Given the value of θl+1, the maximum possible price θ∗l of
the l-th SLA is either (i) U−i∗l + θl+1 when the equal sign of
(35) holds, or (ii) U−i∗l + θl+1 −  when the left side of (35) is
strictly greater than its left side.
Suppose that there exists some l ∈ [1, L − 1] such that
θ∗l is U−i∗l + θl+1. Under such prices, we have that user i
∗
l
achieves the same surplus under the l-th and (l+1)-th SLAs,
i.e., the equal sign in (35) holds; in other words, when user i∗l
makes choice, it will randomly choose the l-th or (l + 1)-th
SLA, as indicated in Section 3.2. Since we are considering
the users’ choices under which a CSP could achieve the
maximum revenue once the corresponding optimal SLA
prices are also given, the existence of the equal-sign case of
(35) means that, with the current price setting, a CSP could
achieve the same maximum revenue no matter which of the
l-th and (l+ 1)-th SLAs is chosen by user i∗l where |C∗l | ≥ 2;
otherwise, the left of (35) should be > its right in order to
ensure that user i∗l will choose the l-th SLA definitely.
However, for all such l ∈ [1, L − 1], we can consider
them in the decreasing order, and increase the price of the
l-th SLA to Ui∗l−1(ϕl) − Ui∗l−1(ϕl+1) + θl+1 − ; then, user
i∗l will change its choice to the (l + 1)-th SLA, the last user
who chooses the l-th SLA will become user i∗l − 1, and the
choices of the other users do not change. In particular, like
our analysis results for θ′1, · · · , θ′L at the beginning, we can
assume after the price increment that the l-th SLA will be
chosen by users i˜∗l−1 + 1, · · · , i˜∗l where i˜∗L is still i∗L and
i˜∗0 is set to zero; here, the price θl of the l-th SLA is still
of the same form as θ′l in Definition 5.1, that is, (i) θL =
Ui˜∗L(ϕL) − , and (ii) θl = (Ui˜∗l (ϕl) − Ui˜∗l (ϕl+1)) + θl+1 − 
for all l ∈ [1, L− 1].
In the case without the price increment, even if user i∗l
changes its choice from the l-th SLA to the (l + 1)-th SLA,
the CSP can still achieve the same maximum revenue under
the prices θ∗1 , · · · , θ∗L; however, as shown by the definition
of the revenue (14), we have after the price increment that
the CSP will achieve a higher revenue, which contradicts
the fact that under the users’ choices defined by i∗1, · · · , i∗L a
CSP could achieve the maximum revenue.
By Theorem 5.3, the L-th SLA’s optimal price is
θ∗L = Ui∗L(ϕL)− ; (36)
the (L− 1)-th SLA’s optimal price could be expressed as
θ∗L−1 = Ui∗L−1(ϕL−1)− (Ui∗L−1(ϕL)− Ui∗L(ϕL))− 2,
i.e., a value smaller than but close enough to the utility of
user i∗L−1 under the (L − 1)-th SLA (i.e., when the waiting
time is ϕL−1) minus the difference of the utilities of users
i∗L−1 and i
∗
L under the L-th SLA. Generalizing this, for all
l ∈ [1, L− 1], the l-th SLA’s optimal price is
θ∗l = Ui∗l (ϕl)−
∑L−1
j=l
D∗j , (37)
where D∗j denotes the difference of the utilities of users i
∗
j
and i∗j+1 under the (j + 1)-th SLA, i.e., D
∗
j = Ui∗j (ϕj+1) −Ui∗j+1(ϕj+1).
In fact, Theorem 5.3 and Lemma 5.5 are the main results
of this subsection and we illustrate this in Figure 8; here,
there exists a sequence 1 ≤ i∗1 < · · · < i∗L ≤ K such that
the optimal prices are determined by (36) and (37) where
the utility Ui∗l (ϕl) of user i∗l under the l-th SLA is simply
denoted by Ui∗l . Finally, we have that
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Fig. 6. Structural Results in the Optimal Pricing (also see (36) and (37)).
Algorithm 3: Optimal Prices of Different SLAs
1 A′ ← {(i1, · · · , iL)|1 ≤ i1 < · · · < iL ≤ K}; // A′ is
a L-combination of {1, 2, · · · ,K}.
2 for every (i1, · · · , iL) ∈ A′, use it to replace the
sequence i∗1, · · · , i∗L in Theorem 5.3 and compute the
corresponding SLA prices (θ′1, · · · , θ′L) by
Theorem 5.3;
3 A ← {(θ′1, θ′2, · · · , θ′L) |(i1, · · · , iL) ∈ A′};
4 θ∗ ← arg max
θ∈A
V (m(θ),Λ+(θ),θ), defined in (15);
// the optimal prices of SLAs are returned,
achieving the highest revenue.
Theorem 5.4. Algorithm 3 returns the optimal prices θ∗ of
different SLAs in polynomial time.
Proof. From Theorem 5.3, once we obtain the sequence i∗1, i
∗
2,
· · · , i∗L in the optimal solution, we could derive the optimal
SLA prices, leading to the maximum revenue (14). The
optimal sequence is among all the subsets of {1, 2, · · · ,K}
whose cardinality is L. Algorithm 3 considers every element
{i1, i2 · · · , iL} of a L-combination of {1, 2, · · · ,K} and
computes the corresponding prices of SLAs. Next, it selects
the element that generates the highest revenue and returns
the SLA prices when using this element to replace the
sequence in Theorem 5.3 and to compute the SLA prices
by Theorem 5.3; hence, the returned prices are the optimal
SLA prices. The time complexity of checking each element
of a L-combination of {1, 2, · · · ,K} is (KL) = K!(K−L)!L! . A
CSP would provide a finite number of SLAs and L could
be bounded by a constant. Hence, Algorithm 3 has a time
complexity polynomial in K .
6 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we numerically evaluate the performance
of the proposed QoS-differentiated pricing model. The key
performance metric is how much the unit revenue of the
CSP improves, compared with the pure usage-based pricing
model without QoS-differentiation. In the usage-based pric-
ing model, users are charged a fixed price whenever they
utilize a server for a unit of time and it corresponds to the
first SLA in our model as explained in Section 3.1.
6.1 Simulation Setup
We assume a total number of K = 50 users. Also, the
job arrival rate hi of each user i is set to 20 jobs in the time
unit. Such parameters are kept fixed in order to evaluate
the impact of other factors’ affects onto the performance of
the QoS-differentiated pricing model. The performance of a
QoS-differentiated pricing model and user’s choices of SLAs
are jointly affected by the following factors: (i) the number
m of servers possessed by a CSP, (ii the user population’s
sensitivity to latency, (iii) the weights of different users,
namely the αis in (3.1)), (iv) the degree to which the server
utilization increases with the waiting time, and (v) the
number L of SLAs offered to users, and the chosen waiting
times ϕ1, · · · , ϕL, stated in Section 3.1. The utility function
employed is the one described in Definition 3.1 and further
specified by (1).
Our performance evaluation is performed by exploring
these five parameters in diverse cases.
Factor 1. We evaluate three cases where a CSP has 1000,
2000, and 4000 servers, respectively.
Factor 2. We consider three cases where a user population
has high, medium, and low sensitivity to latency; correspond-
ingly, we set β to 0.75, 0.45, and 0.25 respectively where
ψ = 0.3. The effect of β on the user population’s utility
(or willingness to pay) is illustrated in Figure 7, e.g., in the
high case, the user’s willingness to pay (or utility) (when
the waiting time is 1.6) decreases to about 0.25 times the
willingness to pay when the waiting time is 0.033.
Factor 3. We consider two cases where the αis’ distribution
is compact and loose respectively. In the former case, for all
l ∈ [1, 50], the weight of the i-th user is set to aN+1−i, where
N = 50 and a = 1.028; we observe that with this choice, for
the assigned sensitivity to latency (i.e., the value of β), the
ratio of the largest weight of users to the smallest one is
3.870. In the latter case, by choosing a = 1.05, this ratio is
rendered larger, e.g., 10.92.
Factor 4. Given users’ willingness to pay, the smaller the
degree to which utilization increases with waiting time,
the smaller the performance improvement of the QoS-
differentiated pricing model over the usage-based pricing
model. As illustrated in Figure 5, we consider the worst
case among them where the Random policy is used, which
is also used in [8] for cloud brokerage services, and the
job’s runtime follows an exponential distribution, to show
the viability of the pricing model of this paper.
Factor 5. We consider L = 6 SLAs and artificially set
ϕ1 = 0.033, ϕ2 = 0.1, ϕ1 = 0.2, ϕ1 = 0.4, ϕ1 = 0.8, and
ϕ1 = 1.6; here, as the waiting time requirement changes
from ϕl to ϕl+1, the utilization has a remarkable increase, as
illustrated in Figure 5.
Performance Metrics. In this paper, the main performance
metric is the revenue improvement of our model compared
to usage-based pricing. In particular, the parameter r(k)i,j is
used to denote the relative gain of the QoS-differentiated
scheme, i.e., the ratio of the total unit revenue gain of
our model to the total unit revenue of the usage-based
pricing model. The ratio is computed for various simula-
tion configurations, k indexing factor 1, i.e., the number
of servers, i indexing factor 2, i.e., the user population’s
sensitivity to latency, and j indexing factor 3, i.e., the
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Fig. 7. Three curves of U(ϕ, α)/U(0.033, α) with β = 0.75, 0.55, 0.2
from top to bottom, implying how much the utility of a population of users
is decreased by as the waiting time increases.
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Fig. 8. Revenue Improvement: the red curve corresponds to the loose
case and the blue one to the tight case, respectively.
weight distribution. In particular, r(k)1,j , r
(k)
2,j , and r
(k)
3,j denote
the cases β = 0.75, 0.45, 0.25, respectively. Also, r(k)i,1 and
r
(k)
i,2 identify the compact and loose cases for the weight
distribution, respectively. Finally, r(1)i,j , r
(2)
i,j , and r
(3)
i,j denote
the parameter values when a CSP has 1000, 2000, and 4000
servers, respectively. For example, r(2)1,1 denotes the ratio in
the case β = 0.75, compact weight distribution, and 2000
servers.
6.2 Results
6.2.1 Overview
The main numerical results are illustrated in Figure 8
where the values of r(k)i,1 and r
(k)
i,2 correspond to the blue and
red ones, respectively. Also, for the sake of representation,
the cases are indexed using a single parameter 3 · (i−1)+k.
The revenue improvement of our model over the standard
usage-based pricing model ranges from 499.2% to 93.63%
in the compact case and from 317.1% to 44.09% in the
loose case, depending on parameters m and β. In all cases,
the revenue improvements are either very large (e.g., up
to 499.2%) or large (e.g., 44.09% in the worst case). From
Figure 8, we could observe the following three phenomena:
(i) Under the same weight distribution and β, and,
given the user population size, the revenue im-
provement decreases with the number of servers a
CSP possesses.
(ii) The smaller the value of β is, the smaller the revenue
improvement is.
(iii) The more compact the weight distribution of users
is, the larger the revenue improvement is.
The first phenomenon is obtained by observing the val-
ues of r(1)i,j , r
(2)
i,j , and r
(3)
i,j given the values of i and j (i.e.,
the values of Y coordinate when the values of X coordinate
are 3 · (i − 1) + 1, 3 · (i − 1) + 2, and 3 · (i − 1) + 3 in
both the loose and compact cases where i = 1, 2, 3). The
second phenomenon is obtained by observing the values of
r
(k)
1,j , r
(k)
2,j , and r
(k)
3,j (i.e., the three values of Y coordinate in
either the loose case or the compact case when the values
of X coordinate are k, 3 + k, and 6 + k where k equals 1,
2, 3). The third phenomenon is obtained by observing the
values of r(k)i,1 and r
(k)
i,2 (i.e., the two values of Y coordinate
respectively in the loose and compact cases when the value
of X coordinate is 3 · (i− 1) + k where i and k equal 1, 2, 3).
As a summary of these three phenomena, we con-
clude that, when a CSP adopts the QoS-differentiated pric-
ing model, a significant revenue improvement could be
achieved especially in the cases where the population of
users is less sensitive to latency, the weights of users
are more compact, and the population of users is large
compared with its processing capacity (i.e., the number of
possessed servers).
6.2.2 Case Analysis
In the following, we take a deeper look at the concrete
numerical results in some typical cases, which are given in
Table 2. Here, each item in the first column specifies the
simulation setup, e.g., the item in the second row implies
that the weight distribution is compact, m = 1000, and
β = 0.55; thus, in Table 2, the rows 2-4, 5, and 6 respectively
give the simulation results in the loose case with β = 0.55,
the loose case with β = 0.2 and m = 2000, and the compact
case with β = 0.55 and m = 2000. The last column of Ta-
ble 2 gives the revenue improvements under these different
cases. In Table 2, in each row, all tuples (y(l)1 , y
(l)
2 , y
(l)
3 , y
(l)
4 )
under the l-th SLA constitute an optimal solution in the case
specified by the values of the first column; the cross denotes
that this SLA will not be offered to users. Now, we explain
the meaning of each tuple. The l-th SLA’s price is specified
by the greened y(l)2 ; at the l-th processing unit, the optimal
rate of accepting jobs and the number of assigned servers
are respectively the blued y(l)3 and the red y
(l)
4 . In the case
that the (l − 1)-th SLA is offered to users, the indexes of
users that will choose the l-th SLA are y(l−1)1 + 1, · · · , y(l)1 ;
in the case that l = 1 or the (l− 1)-th SLA is not offered, the
corresponding indexes of users are 1, · · · , y(l)l .
When analyzing these concrete results to better under-
stand the logic under which the above three phenomena
occur, we need to keep the following points in mind. The
unit revenue from a server in a unit of time is the product
of the server’s utilization and the price associated with it.
Given the l-th SLA offered to users, let l′ denote the total
number of offered SLAs after the l-th SLA, e.g., in the 2nd
row of Table 2, if l = 4, l′ = 2. As illustrated in Figure 8, the
price of the l-th SLA is U
y
(l)
1
(ϕl)−
∑l+l′−1
j=l D
∗
j − (l′ + 1) · 
if l′ > 0 and U
y
(l)
1
(ϕl) −  if l′ = 0; here, Uy(l)1 (ϕl) is
the utility of the y(l)1 -th user when the waiting time is ϕl,
and D∗j is the difference of the utilities of users y
(j)
1 and
y
(j+1)
1 when the waiting time is ϕj+1. A larger Uy(l)1 (ϕl)
and a smaller
∑l+l′
j=l D
∗
j can lead to a larger SLA price, and
vice versa; this is one basis to analyze the concrete results
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1st
SLA 2nd SLA 3rd SLA 4th SLA 5th SLA 6th SLA
Revenue
Improvement (r(k)i,j )
(loose,
1000, 0.55) × ×
(2, 20.81, 40,
240)
(10, 16.16, 160,
560)
(13, 12.61, 60,
135)
(15, 9.64, 40,
65) 258.5%
(loose,
2000, 0.55) ×
(3, 20.03, 60,
661)
(11, 16.7, 160,
960)
(14, 13.69, 60,
210)
(17, 10.77, 60,
136)
(18, 8.33, 20,
33) 138.7%
(loose,
2000, 0.2) ×
(4, 17.46, 80,
880)
(11, 13.25, 140,
840)
(15, 9.63, 80,
280) × × 110.9%
(compact,
2000, 0.55) × ×
(6, 6.733, 120,
720)
(19, 5.256, 260,
910)
(25, 4.093, 120,
271)
(28, 3.141, 60,
98) 234.7%
TABLE 2
The Optimal Solutions under Different Cases: the red, green and blue numbers denotes the number of assigned servers, the SLA price,
and the optimal rate of accepting jobs, respectively.
(loose, 1000,
0.55)
(loose, 2000,
0.55)
(loose, 2000,
0.2)
(compact,
2000, 0.55)
(2, 39.81,
31.95, 1000)
(4, 36.11,
63.89, 2000)
(4, 29.84,
63.89, 2000)
(4, 13.35,
63.89, 2000)
TABLE 3
The Optimal Solutions for the On-demand Pricing Model under
Different Cases.
in Table 2. On the other hand, the ratios of the maximum
possible utilizations of a server under the 1st, 2nd, 3rd,
4th, 5th, and 6th SLAs to the utilization under the 1st SLA
are respectively 1, 2.846, 5.217, 8.944, 13.91, and 19.26. The
number of servers assigned for each SLA, the SLA price,
and the server utilization together determine the revenue
of a CSP. In contrast, the standard on-demand model is a
special case and corresponds to the first SLA of our model;
the related simulation results to be used are listed in Table 3.
For example, the first column says that, under the compact
case where m = 1000 and β = 0.55, the optimal solution
is specified by the tuple (2, 39.81, 31.95, 1000). This tuple
implies that, partial jobs of the first two users will be served
with a price of 39.81, and, the CSP accepts jobs at a rate of
39.81 with all 1000 servers allocated.
Phenomenon (i). Now, we begin to observe the results in the
loose case with β = 0.55, i.e., the 2-3 rows of Table 2. With
more servers available to process jobs (i.e., a larger m), a
CSP is allowed to admit more users (see the purpled values
under the 6th SLA).
These accepted users are distributed to different SLAs,
and, under the same SLA l, we could see a larger y(l)1 in
the case with a larger m. To a large extent, this leads to
a smaller price for the case with a larger m. For example,
the price of the 4th SLA in the case with m = 1000 is
U10(ϕ4) − (U10(ϕ5)− U13(ϕ5)) − (U13(ϕ6)− U15(ϕ6)) =
19.2866 − 2.1428 − 0.9883 = 16.1555; its price in the
case with m = 2000 is U14(ϕ4) − (U14(ϕ5)− U17(ϕ5)) −
(U17(ϕ6)− U18(ϕ6)) = 15.8671−1.7629−0.4165 = 13.6878.
QoS-differentiated pricing allows admitting more users than
on-demand pricing where only the first SLA is offered;
when m increases from 1000 to 2000, the difference of the
two values y(l)1 (l = 3, 4, 5, 6) in the former case (illustrated
in Table 2) is larger than the difference of the two values y(1)1
in the latter case (illustrated in Table 3).
Since y(l)1 can greatly affect the price in our simulation,
the degree of price deduction in the former case is larger the
one in the latter case. This is also shown by a larger unit
revenue decline; in particular, using the results in Table 3,
the unit revenue decreases by 9.31% when the number
m of possessed servers increases from 1000 to 2000; with
Table 2, the unit revenues respectively under the 3rd, 4th,
5th, and 6th SLAs decrease by 19.75%, 15.28%, 15.22%, and
14.90%. Furthermore, we could conclude from the rows 2-
3 of Table 2 that, the unit revenue is increasing from a
lower SLA (a higher QoS requirement) to a higher SLA; in
particular, the unit revenues in the 2nd (resp. 3rd) row are
respectively 3.4683, 4.6171, 5.6044, and 5.9323 (resp. 1.8182,
2.7833, 3.9114, 4.7515, and 5.0485). Overall, it happens that
the revenue improvement decreases as m becomes larger,
after these unit revenues are weighted by the numbers of
assigned servers.
Phenomenon (ii). Let us compare the results in the rows
3 and 4 where users respectively have medium and high
sensitivities to latency (β equals 0.55 and 0.2 respectively).
In the case that users are more sensitive to latency (i.e.,
β = 0.2), (i) only three SLAs (i.e., the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th
SLAs) are provided to users (the 5-th and 6-th SLAs with
the largest waiting times will not be offered) and (ii) less
users are accepted to rejected some users with lower utilities
(the first 15 users with the larger utilities are accepted), in
contrast to the optimal solution in the case with β = 0.55.
These two points ensure that a smaller value y(l)1 is asso-
ciated under each offered SLA, and the offered SLAs are
also associated with smaller waiting times. As illustrated in
Figure 7, as β becomes smaller, the utilities (or willingness to
pay) of users decrease more dramatically with the increment
of waiting time. So, these two points lead to that the prices
and the unit revenues of the offered SLAs are still relatively
high in the case with β = 0.2.
However, as shown in the simulations, the revenue im-
provement still decreases as users become more sensitive to
latency. In on-demand pricing, using Table 3, we derive that
the unit revenue decreases by the unit revenue decreases
by 17.36% when β decreases from 0.55 to 0.2; with Table 2,
the unit revenues respectively under the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th
SLAs decrease by 12.70%, 20.66%, and 29.66%. Furthermore,
we could conclude from the rows 3-4 of Table 2 that, the
unit revenue is increasing from a lower SLA (a higher
QoS requirement) to a higher SLA; in particular, the unit
revenues in the 4nd (resp. 3rd) row are respectively 1.5873,
2.2083, and 2.7514 (resp. 1.8182, 2.7833, 3.9114, 4.7515, and
5.0485). Overall, it happens that the revenue improvement
decreases as β becomes smaller, after these unit revenues
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are weighted by the numbers of assigned servers.
Phenomenon (iii). We look at the rows 3 and 5 of Table 2
where users respectively have loose and compact weight
distributions (also see the columns 2 and 4 of Table 3); 18
users are accepted in the loose case while 10 more users are
accepted in the compact case.
In the loose case, the ratios of the prices of these offered
SLAs (the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th SLAs) in QoS-differentiated
pricing to the on-demand price in the column 2 of Table 3
are 46.25%, 37.91%, 29.83%, and 23.07%; in the compact
case, these ratios are 50.43%, 39.37%, 30.66%, and 23.53%.
In the compact case, more accepted users don’t lead to that
the price of each SLA reduce more heavily. In the loose
case with m = 2000 and β = 0.55, the ratios of the unit
revenues from the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th SLAs to the
unit revenue where only the first SLA is offered are 1.5762,
2.4129, 3.3908, 4.1191, and 4.3765; in the compact case, these
ratios of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th SLAs are 2.6313, 3.5213,
4.2498, and 4.5093. After these unit revenues are weighted
by the number of servers assigned to each SLA, we can see
that it happens that the revenue improvement increases as
the weight distribution becomes more compact.
By the phenomenon here, we noticed another phe-
nomenon that the 2nd SLA is offered in the loose case
but it is not so in the compact case. To understand this
phenomenon, we consider the case where the 2nd SLA is
not offered but the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th SLAs are offered
in the loose case. Roughly, in this case, more users could
be accepted since servers have higher utilizations under the
3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th SLAs than the 2nd SLA; similar to
our analysis of the first phenomenon, this could reduce the
SLA’s prices and the unit revenue on the whole.
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In cloud computing, there exist both latency-critical jobs
and jobs that could tolerate some degree of delay. The re-
source efficiency of a system is much dependent on the job’s
latency requirement. From a user’s point of view, posted
pricing has high usability. In such context, we propose the
first analytical model for QoS-differentiated posted pricing.
We consider a cloud computing system where the system is
partitioned into multiple independent subsystems.
Optimal schemes have been proposed to address prop-
erly two key, intertwined aspects of the model: (i) the pricing
of different levels of QoS requirements, and, (ii) the arrival
rate of jobs accepted to be processed, in connection with
the number of servers assigned to each QoS level. Queuing
models let us derive a general analytical framework, which
adapts to several popular dispatching policies. Numerical
simulations show that the revenue of a CSP could be im-
proved by up to a five-fold increase, with an improved
system’s utilization. The analytical results of this paper
provides a framework to easily evaluate the performance
of QoS-differentiated pricing in cloud computing, given the
computing capacity of a CSP and the environments that a
CSP faces (the size of a users’ population, the amount of
demanded computing resource, and the users’ sensitivity to
latency).
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APPENDIX A
Proof of Lemma 5.1. Recall that, our objective is maximizing
(14) where θ is pre-assigned; in terms of the decision vari-
able Λ+l , the constraints that matter are (6) and (9) alone.
Hence, the optimal value of Λ+l under an arbitrary m is the
maximum possible value that simultaneously satisfies (6)
and (9), i.e., it equals min{Λl, ml · λ(l)max}. Here, in the first
case that ml · λ(l)max ≤ Λl, we have Λ+l = ml · λ(l)max where
ml ≤ ml.
In the second case that ml ·λ(l)max > Λl, we have Λ+l = Λl.
In the latter case, we also have ml = ml + 1 where λ′l > 0;
now, we begin to prove this by contradiction. We first prove
ml = dΛl/λ(l)maxe, which is the minimum number of servers
needed by Lemma 3.2. Otherwise, ml > dΛl/λ(l)maxe and,
there exists some l′ ( 6= l) such that ml′ · λ(l)max < Λl by the
assumption (18). By increasing ml′ by ml − dΛl/λ(l)maxe and
reducingml to dΛl/λ(l)maxe, this allows setting Λ+l′ to a higher
value min{Λl′ , ml′ · λ(l
′)
max} while the value of Λ+l does not
decrease, i.e., Λ+l = min{Λl, ml · λ(l)max} = Λl; as a result,
the value of the item θl′ · Λ+l′ in the objective function (14)
is increased, as well as the value of the objective function.
This contradicts thatm and Λ+ are an optimal solution and
we thus have ml = dΛl/λ(l)maxe. Now, we prove λ′l > 0 by
contradiction. Otherwise, λ′l = Λl −ml · λ(l)max = 0 and we
have ml = ml, which contradicts the second case where
ml · λ(l)max > Λl.
Proof of Observation 5.1. Since the mapping f is a surjection,
given an arbitrary feasible solution x ∈ X to the problem
A, there exists a feasible solution y to the problem B where
x = f(y); here, the objective functions in the two problems
A and B achieve the same value. Hence, the optimal value
of the problem B is an upper bound of the optimal value
of A. On the other hand, since f is a mapping from Y to
X , given an optimal solution y∗ ∈ Y to B, x = f(y∗)
is a feasible solution to A where f(y) ∈ X ; here, the two
objective functions in A and B still achieve the same value
and hence x = f(y∗) is an optimal solution to the problem
A where x∗ = f(y∗).
Proof of Observation 5.2. The determinant of the matrix A is
> 0 and it is invertible. Hence, one
[
xl yl
]
corresponds to
one unique
[
ml Λ
+
l
]
, and vice versa. In the following, we
first show that, given an arbitrary
[
xl yl
]
satisfying (21)
and (22), the corresponding
[
ml Λ
+
l
]
(that is defined by
(23)) satisfies Lemma 5.1, as well as the constraints (5), (6),
and (9). This shows that (23) defines a mapping.
By (23), we have ml = xl+yl and Λ+l = λ
(l)
max ·xl+λ′l ·yl.
With (21), we have 0 ≤ xl ≤ ml and yl ∈ {0, 1}; further, the
ml and Λ+l here satisfy (6), and (9) respectively by (19) and
(20). Due to (22), the m1, · · · , mL also satisfy (5). By (21),
there are three possible cases for the values of xl and yl: (i)
xl < ml, yl = 0, (ii) xl = ml and yl = 0, and (iii) xl = ml
and yl = 1. In the second case, λ′l may be either > 0 or
= 0; in the third case, λ′l > 0. In the first case, we have
ml = xl < ml and Λ+l = λ
(l)
max · ml. In the second case,
we have ml = xl = ml and Λ+l = λ
(l)
max · ml. In the third
case where λ′l > 0, we have ml = xl + yl = ml + 1 and
Λ+l = λ
(l)
max · ml + λ′l = Λl by the definition of ml. After
checking the corresponding ml and Λ+l in each of the above
cases, we conclude that Lemma 5.1 could be satisfied.
Secondly, we show that, given an arbitrary
[
ml Λ
+
l
]
satisfying Lemma 5.1, (5), (6), and (9), the corresponding[
xl yl
]
(defined by (23)) satisfies (21) and (22). This finally
shows that (23) defines a surjection. Since ml = xl + yl and
due to (5), the xl and yl here satisfy (22). By Lemma 5.1, there
are only two possible cases for the variable Λ+l : (i) Λ
+
l < Λl,
and (ii) Λ+l = Λl. In the first case, we have Λ
+
l = ml · λ(l)max
and ml ≤ ml by Lemma 5.1 and further have xl = ml ≤ ml
and yl = 0, which satisfy (21). In the second case, if Λl =
ml · λ(l)max, we have λ′l = 0 and ml = ml, and further have
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xl = ml and yl = 0 by (23); otherwise, Λl > ml · λ(l)max, we
have λ′l > 0 and ml = ml + 1 by Lemma 5.1 and further
have xl = ml and yl = 1. Here, (21) is also satisfied. Finally,
the lemma holds.
Proof of Observation 5.3. We first prove that (24) defines a
mapping. For an arbitrary ({xl}l∈A, {yl}l∈B) that satis-
fies (25) and (26), we will show that the corresponding({xl}Ll=1, {yl}Ll=1) (defined by (24)) satisfies (21) and (22).
For all l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , L} − A where ml = 0, we have that
xl = 0 satisfies constraint (21); for all l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , L} − B
where λ′l = 0, we have that yl = 0 also satisfies (21). For all
xl where l ∈ A, and yl where l ∈ B and λ′l > 0, they satisfy
constraint (25), also satisfying (21). Hence, (24) defines a
mapping.
Secondly, we prove that (24) defines a surjection. For
an arbitrary
({xl}Ll=1, {yl}Ll=1) that satisfies (21) and (22),
we will show that there exists a corresponding ({xl}l∈A,
{yl}l∈B) that satisfies (25) and (26). For all xl where l ∈ A,
and yl where l ∈ B, they satisfy constraint (21), also satisfy-
ing (25). In the case that l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , L}−Awhere ml = 0,
we derive xl = 0 due to the constraint (21) alone; in the case
that l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , L} − B where λ′l = 0, we also derive
yl = 0 due to (21) alone. As a result, if
({xl}Ll=1, {yl}Ll=1)
satisfies (22), ({xl}l∈A, {yl}l∈B) also satisfies (26). Finally,
the lemma holds.
Proof of Observation 5.4. We first prove that (30) defines a
mapping, i.e., given an arbitrary (xl,1, · · · , xl,ml , yl) that sat-
isfies (27), (29) and (28), the corresponding xl and yl satisfy
(25) and (26). Due to (27), we have 0 ≤ xl =
∑ml
j=1 xl,j ≤ ml
where ml > 0 for all l ∈ A; together with (28), the constraint
(25) holds. Due to (29), (26) also holds. Further, we prove
that (30) defines a surjection. For an arbitrary (xl, yl) that
satisfies (25) and (26) where l ∈ A, it holds naturally
that there exist feasible xl,1, · · · , xl,ml ∈ {0, 1} such that
xl =
∑ml
j=1 xl,j , where xl,1, · · · , xl,ml and yl satisfy (27),
(28), and (29).
Proof of Theorem 5.2. We first show that Algorithm 1 pro-
duces a feasible solution to Problem 5. Algorithm 1 obeys
the constraints (27) and (29), without accounting for (28).
However, we will show that (28) is still satisfied since
ζ
(1)
l,j > ζ
(2)
l : this is due to that, if
∑ml
j=1 xl,j < ml, only a
part of variables xl,1, · · · , xl,ml are set to 1 and all the other
variables are set to 0; then, the variable yl is not chosen and
is set to 0.
Next, we prove the optimality by contradiction. Con-
sider an optimal solution in which D′ denotes the variables
whose values are set to 1 and the values of the other
variables are set to 0. Here, D′ contains a variable whose
coefficient is not among the largest m coefficients. However,
in this case, the objective function could achieve a higher
value by set a variable with a larger coefficient to one and
setting the value of this variable to 0, which contradicts that
D′ defines an optimal solution.
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Algorithm 2 first calls Algorithm 1 (line
1), which gives an optimal solution to Problem 5, by Theo-
rem 1. Built on this, the lines 2-3 give an optimal solution to
Problem 4 by Lemma 5.4. By Lemma 5.3, the lines 4-5 give
an optimal solution to Problem 3. Finally, by Lemma 5.2, the
lines 6-7 give an optimal solution to Problem 1.
